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Abstract
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1 Introduction
The essential role of the entry, exit, and survival of rms has been emphasized in growth
theory. In Schumpeterian growth models,1 the economy grows through survival cycles
commencing with the entry of a research and development (R&D) rm inventing a new
high-quality technology and ending with the exit of the rm by destruction of its rents
once a newer technology is introduced. Recent research stresses endogenous survival
of rms engaging in private rent protection and examines the consequences for innova-
tion and long-run growth (Dinopoulos and Syropoulos 2007, Eicher and García-Peñalosa
2008).2 In line with these studies, this note examines the e¤ects of R&D policies on rm
survival, innovation, and growth.
The struggle to survive in the real world typically requires that rms make dynamic
decisions.3 We highlight this aspect, using a variety-based growth model with product
obsolescence (Lai 1998). In doing so, we model R&D rms engaging in investments with
the aim of increasing their probability of survival against obsolescence by means of a
dynamic programming approach provided by Akiyama, Furukawa, and Yano (2011).4
This approach results in a tractable equilibrium behavior of surviving rms, which is
analogous to the equilibrium behavior in Dinopoulos and Syropouloss (2007) quality-
ladder model.
The main nding of this paper is that if R&D rms invest in their intertemporal
survival, R&D policies may reduce innovation and long-run growth. Specically, if patent
protection is too strong,5 a higher R&D subsidy rate delivers insu¢ cient investments for
the survival of R&D rms, depressing innovation and growth in the long run. This
contrasts with the property of the standard R&D-based growth model whereby R&D
subsidies promote innovation and growth, which holds in the Dinopoulos and Syropoulos
model. In addition, the policy implication of our result is new to the literature6 in
suggesting a substantial interdependence between the two R&D policy instruments of
R&D subsidies and patent protection. This note extends this line of research by showing
that R&D subsidies can interact with patent policy to have a negative e¤ect on innovation
and growth.
1See Segerstrom, Anant, and Dinopoulos (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and
Howitt (1992).
2See Grieben and Sener (2009), Radhakrishnan (2011), and Davis and Sener (2012) for quality-ladder
models based on Dinopoulos and Syropouloss setting. See Akiyama and Furukawa (2010) for a North
South analysis. Another related work is Thoenig and Verdier (2003), who use a quality-based model
to argue that a rm can endogenously avoid obsolescence by using a defensive, more tacit-knowledge-
intensive technology. More broadly, our basic framework may be related to the market quality theory of
Yano (2008, 2009), in which institutions are considered endogenous.
3This is the common view in a variety of elds including industrial organization, marketing, and
technology management. See, for example, Agarwal and Gort (2002).
4The present study di¤ers from Akiyama, Furukawa, and Yano (2011) in two respects. First, we
focus on product obsolescence in a closed economy, whereas they considered imitation of products in
a NorthSouth setting (where no product becomes obsolete). Second, we analyze the e¤ects of R&D
subsidies and patent breadth and show an interdependence between R&D policy levers.
5Following Li (2001) and many others, we measure the strength of patent protection by patent breadth.
6See, for example, Segerstrom (2000), Li (2001), Goh and Olivier (2002), Chu (2009, 2011), Chu,
Cozzi, and Galli (2012), Chu, Pan, and Sun (2012), and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013).
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2 The Model
We consider a variety expansion model of endogenous growth à la Romer (1990) and
Grossman and Helpman (1991). We assume discrete time because it is useful to model
endogenous survival activities of rms in a variety expansion model by means of the
dynamic programming approach (Akiyama, Furukawa, and Yano 2011). There is an
innitely lived representative consumer who inelastically supplies L units of labor in
each period. This consumer is endowed with the utility function U =
P1
t=0 
t lnCt;
where  2 (0; 1) is the time preference rate and the consumption Ct is dened as a
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function on the continuum of di¤erentiated
goods: Ct =
R Nt
0
xt(j)
( 1)=dj
=( 1)
; where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution;
xt(j) is the amount of di¤erentiated good j; and Nt is the number of goods available in
period t: It is well known that the corresponding dynamic optimization problem has a
solution that yields the Euler equation:
Et+1
Et
= (1 + rt); (1)
where rt is the interest rate and Et =
R Nt
0
pt(j)xt(j)dj represents the consumers spending
in period t with the price pt(j) of nal good j: The static demand function for good j
is given by xt(j) = Et (pt(j))
  = (Pt)
1  ; where Pt is the price index dened by Pt =R Nt
0
pt(j)
1 dj
1=(1 )
: Assume that a unit of each good j can be manufactured from a
unit of labor. If good j survives up until period t; it is manufactured by the monopolistic
rm (patent holder).
To allow for a role for patent policy, we consider an upper-bound  2 (1; =(   1)]
in the markup.7 Therefore, the equilibrium price becomes pt(i) = wt, where wt is the
wage rate. As in the existing literature,8 we interpret  as patent breadth (i.e., a measure
for the strength of patent protection). In this setting, a larger patent breadth  means
a higher markup in accordance with the seminal vision of Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) on
breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise the price.This pricing gives rise to the
following demand and prot functions:
xt(j) = xt =
Et
wtNt
and t(j) = t =

  1


Et
Nt
: (2)
2.1 R&D and Survival
There are a number of perfectly competitive potential R&D rms. A potential R&D
rm can innovate one new technology to produce a new intermediate good in period t
by investing 1= (Nt 1) units of labor in period t   1; where the standard assumptions
regarding knowledge spillover are assumed. Here,  2 [0;1) denotes the productivity of
R&D. We denote s 2 [0; 1) as a subsidy rate for innovation, so that the unit cost of R&D
is equal to (1  s)wt 1=:9
7To allow for a su¢ ciently large patent breadth ; we consider that  is su¢ ciently small. To verify
that su¢ ciently large patent breadths are not empirically too restrictive, we can provide a calibration
result; see Section 4.
8See also Li (2001), Goh and Olivier (2002), Chu (2011), and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) for a
similar formulation in the dynamic general equilibrium model.
9This subsidy is nanced by a lump-sum tax.
3
A rm that successfully innovates a new product, j; manufactures product j monopo-
listically, thereby earning a monopolistic rent in period t; t: This rent continues through
subsequent periods. At an endogenous probability of 1  t(j); where t(j) 2 [0; 1] stands
for the probability of survival at the end of period t, we assume that an innovated good
j becomes obsolete and the R&D rm innovating good j has to leave the market. This
assumption is based on Lais (1998) assumption of product obsolescence over the endoge-
nously expanding variety of di¤erentiated goods.10
We consider that the R&Drm engages in a struggle to avoid obsolescence and survive.
To incorporate this, we follow Akiyama, Furukawa, and Yano (2011) by assuming that
the rm can increase the probability of survival t(j) by investing zt(j)=Nt units of labor
in period t.11 Specically, t(j) = (zt(j))
 ; in which zt(j) 2 [0; 1] denotes the intensity
of survival investment and  2 (0; 1) is a technological parameter.12 An active R&D
rms value is the expectation of the net present discounted value of prots. Given that
t(j) = t in (2), we have zt(j) = zt and t(j) = t for all j in equilibrium. The R&D
rms behavior can be described as the following Bellman equation:
V t = max
zt2[0;1]; t=(zt)

t   wtzt
Nt
+ t
V t+1
1 + rt

: (3)
The solution to (3) gives rise to the following policy function:
zt = min
(
V t+1=(1 + rt)
wt=Nt
1=(1 )
; 1
)
:13 (4)
This is essentially analogous to the equilibrium condition on rent protection activities in
Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007) and other studies based on their approach. However,
as discussed later, the policy implications of our model are di¤erent.
Before proceeding, it is important to consider more specically the survival invest-
ment against product obsolescence. If we followed Ethiers (1982) interpretation that the
di¤erentiated goods were intermediate goods used for producing the consumption good
Ct through the CES production function, then we would suppose that an intermediate
product becomes obsolete as a result of the introduction of new, more high-tech inter-
mediate goods. The survival investment would be made to update/upgrade the invented
intermediate product to catch up with cutting-edge standards. In this note, we inter-
pret the di¤erentiated goods as consumption goods. The survival investment of a rm
is made to update/upgrade the product and keep the consumer interested in its inno-
vated consumption good; this is more akin to the vision of Lai (1998) that a consumption
good becomes obsolete owing to the introduction of more sophisticated goodsfor the
consumer with a love of sophistication.For either interpretation, our point is that the
incumbent rms invest in their survival against product obsolescence.
10Whereas his focus is on gradual obsolescence, we consider that product obsolescence is stochastic and
discrete. We leave for future research the task of analyzing rm survival against gradual obsolescence.
11We also assume the knowledge spillover e¤ect for the survival investment.
12For simplicity, we adopt the simplest function for survival probability t(j), but we obtain qualita-
tively the same results using a more general form of the survival probability such as t(j) = (zt(j))

+ 
or ( (zt(j))

+ (1  ) ())1= ; where  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1) are parameters that capture market or
institutional attributes for rm survival.
13Clearly, zt = 0 is not an equilibrium choice because dt=dzt !1 as zt ! 0. Noting t  1; the usual
KarushKuhnTucker solution leads to (4). Note that the transversality condition is satised, because
t is uniformly bounded in the present model.
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2.2 Market Equilibrium
Free entry into the R&D market ensures that the discounted value of an innovation is
equal to the cost, so that we have:
V t+1
1 + rt
=
(1  s)wt
Nt
: (5)
From (4) and (5), in market equilibrium, the intensity of survival investment and the
probability of survival, zt and 

t ; respectively, are independent of time: z

t = z
 and
t = 
 for all t: Specically,
z =

( (1  s) =) 11  if  (1  s) = < 1
1 if  (1  s) =  1 ; (6)
 =

( (1  s) =) 1  if  (1  s) = < 1
1 if  (1  s) =  1 : (7)
Note that the lifetime () becomes shorter when the R&D subsidy rate s increases. This
is because the rm responds to large R&D subsidies by investing more in innovation than
in survival.
Now we can close the model by considering two conditions. First, the number Nt of
consumption goods changes over time, which increases with an innovation and decreases
with the exit of rms. Then, we have:
Nt+1 = 
Nt +Mt; (8)
where Mt denotes the inow of innovation made in period t and Nt is the number of
rms that survive at the end of period t: Second, the labor market clearing condition is
given by:
L = Ntxt +

1
Nt

Mt +

z
Nt

Nt; (9)
in which the right-hand side denotes the three labor demands: Ntxt for production,
1
Nt

Mt for innovation, and

z
Nt

Nt for survival.
By (1), (2), (3), (5), (8) and (9), we can characterize the long-run equilibrium of the
model with the following theorem.
Theorem 1 In the initial period 0; the economy jumps into a unique balanced growth
path that is characterized by the following long-run rate of economic growth:
1 + g =

1  s+  (  1) (L (  1) + (  s) 
   z) ; (10)
where g = (Nt+1   Nt)=Nt for all t  0: The equilibrium investment and probability of
survival, z and , are given by (6) and (7).
Proof. See Appendix A.
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3 E¤ects of R&D Subsidies and Patent Protection
We will examine the e¤ects of two R&D policy levers: subsidies and patent protection
(i.e., patent breadth in our analysis). To do this, we have the following preliminary result:
The higher the R&D subsidy rate s is, the lower the probability of survival of rms  is.
This result is intuitive: the rms respond to an increased R&D subsidy rate by engaging
more in R&D than they do in survival activities.
Taking into account this e¤ect, we rst use (10) together with (6) and (7) to verify
that, when no rm exit is to take place in equilibrium ( = 1 as  (1  s) =  1), the
R&D subsidy only has the usual growth-enhancing e¤ect: g increases with s:14 However,
the e¤ect may be di¤erent for a more realistic case where some rms leave the market in
each period ( < 1 as  (1  s) = < 1). Di¤erentiating (10) with respect to s; we have
the following proposition.15
Proposition 1 In the presence of rm exit (when  (1  s) = < 1), the e¤ect of an
increase in the R&D subsidy rate s on growth g is negative if the patent breadth  is
su¢ ciently large.
Proposition 1 shows an interdependence between these two policies subsidies and
patent breadth suggesting that whether the R&D subsidy enhances growth depends
on the patent breadth. The intuition for this policy interdependence is as follows. A
higher R&D subsidy rate s results in a decrease in the expectation of the R&D rm
values, by reducing the probability of survival  (preliminary result). The decrease in
the probability of survival  has a much more serious and damaging e¤ect on the expected
value of R&D rms (consisting of the future prots) when the future prots are larger
because of a larger patent breadth . Therefore, as  is large, the e¤ect of a larger R&D
subsidy rate on innovation and growth tends to be negative.
Although our model and the Dinopoulos and Syropoulos model have similar equilib-
rium behaviors of R&D rms in survival, R&D subsidies always increase innovation in
the Dinopoulos and Syropoulos model, in contrast to ours. This di¤erence comes from
the fact that, in the Dinopoulos and Syropoulos model, endogenous growth is driven by
quality improvement and the survival activity (rent protection) makes further research
di¢ cult. In this sense, the survival investment hurts future innovation. In our model,
while the growth engine is variety expansion and the mechanics of obsolescence are dif-
ferent, the survival activity does not discourage future research. Rather, the survival
of existing R&D rms, as well as the entry of new R&D rms, can encourage long-run
growth in our model. Therefore, too many R&D subsidies may decrease innovation by
losing the balance between R&D and survival in the resource distribution.
4 Quantitative Analysis
To see whether real-world patent protection results in a positive or negative e¤ect on
R&D subsidies, we calibrate the model containing a square-root survival function by
normalizing  = 0:5: Consider the set of variables, f; ; ; s; gg: We set the time pref-
erence rate  to a standard value of 0:97. As for patent breadth (i.e., the measure for
14See Appendix B for the formal proof.
15See Appendix B for the formal proof.
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patent protection), we consider two polar levels of the markup from the realistic range,
 2 f1:6; 2:5g.16 We work on the entire range of the subsidy rate s 2 (0; 1) : Using a
plausible rate of survival, 0:925,17 we calibrate the R&D productivity : Finally, we take
a realistic growth rate g = 0:016 as the benchmark:18
Numerical calculations show that, for the large patent breadth case ( = 2:5), the
growth e¤ect of R&D subsidies s is negative above a very low threshold, s ' 0:08 (about
8 percent). Even for the small patent breadth case ( = 1:6), the threshold level goes
up to s ' 0:18 (about 18 percent). Given the real-world average rates of R&D subsidies
(approximately 10 percent for the US, 20 percent for the UK, 30 percent for Canada,
and 40 percent for France),19 our calculations suggest that, in countries with a high R&D
subsidy rate such as Canada and France, the current level of patent breadth may have
a negative e¤ect of R&D subsidies on innovation and economic growth because of the
decreased survival of R&D rms.
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Appendix A:
By (5) wt =
V t+1
1+rt
Nt
1 s : With (1), this implies
wt =
EtV

t+1
Et+1
Nt
1  s: (A1a)
By substituting (2), (8), and (A1a) into (9), we can obtain:
Nt+1
Nt
=
L+    z
1 s

+
V t+1Nt+1
Et+1
V t+1Nt+1
Et+1
: (A1b)
Noting (1), (2), and (A1a), (3) can become in equilibrium
V t =

  1


Et
Nt
+

   z

1  s

EtV

t+1
Et+1
: (A1c)
By multiplying both sides of (A1c) by Nt=Et; with (A1b), we can rewrite (A1c) as
V t+1Nt+1
Et+1
=
L+    z

 
   
1 sz
 V t NtEt

(A2)
  1

 
L (1   1) + (1  s=)    z
   z
1 s
!
:
The steady state v satisfying that
V t+1Nt+1
Et+1
=
V t Nt
Et
= v for any t is given by
v =
 (1  (1=))L+ (1  s=)    z
L+ (1  )  +  (1 s)
1 s z
 : (A3)
By (A2), by means of a usual phase diagram analysis, we can show that only a path
starting from v is consistent with the transversality condition and dynamic optimization;
V t Nt
Et
= v for all t  0 (saddle-path stability). By substituting (A3) into (A1b) implies
(10). To ensure g > 0; we assume the labor force is su¢ ciently large to meet:
(  1)L  z > (1  ) (1  s)

+ (1  )   s

> 0; (A4)
which implies (  1)L > z:
Appendix B:
When  (1  s) = < 1; by di¤erentiating (10) with respect to s; with (6), we obtain
d
ds
(1 + g) (B1)
=

  1
L+(1 )+((1 s) )

1  (s+(1 )(1 s)  1 (1 s+( 1))(1+
s( 1)
(1 )(1 s)))
(( 1)(1 s)+)2
:
As  goes to 1, the rst two terms in the right-hand side go to 0 while the third term
goes to  1: As ! 1; the right-hand side of (B1) goes to +1: When  (1  s) =  1;
by (6), (7), and (10), we have
d
ds
(1 + g) = 
1   + 
 1 ((  1)L  z)
((1  s) + (  1))2 ; (B2)
which is strictly positive as (  1)L > z must hold for a positive growth rate, g > 0;
see Appendix A.
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